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1962/10/23

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2115 D B1A5 65 141
October 23, 1962

EXCISE

TO : The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM : EUR - Mr. Tyler
S/P - Mr. Rostow
NEA - Mr. Talbot

SUBJECT: Cuba

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY *[Signature]*

DATE 4-4-67

() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
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FOIA Exemptions _____
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FOIA Exemptions _____ (b) (1); (b) (5).
TS Exemptions _____

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() LOW-LEVEL TS to () S or () C OADR

1. Problem: This memorandum proposes a course of action designed:

(a) to close out the Cuba crisis before mounting public pressures and incidents of blockade force us to escalation which would increase both war risks and divisive pressures within the alliance;

(b) to permit us to draw constructive advantage from the crisis in prosecuting our own positive purposes in Europe.

2. Proposal:

(a) Ambassador Finletter should announce in Paris that the US now considers that an early program for MRBM deployment in Europe would have positive value. He should indicate that the US is prepared to go forward with such a program as soon as four or five other nations decide to participate. The Germans, Italians, Belgians, Turks and Canadians have favored the multilateral force, and would probably respond with a strong show of interest to such a US lead.

(b) We should privately urge the Turkish Government to announce that it would be willing to phase out its

IS/PPC/CDR 4/3/97

land-based

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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FOIA Exemptions *B1*
PA Exemptions _____

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EO Citations _____

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() CLASSIFY as () S or () C OADR
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land-based IREMs as soon as it was clear that a multilateral sea-based force was likely to be at hand in the Eastern Mediterranean to take its place.

(c) There should then follow an exchange of declarations between the great powers that they will desist from deploying MRBM's to two troubled areas: the Caribbean and the Middle East. The US declaration could, in its reference to Iran and Turkey, simply take note of these two governments' stated policies and indicate its intent to respect them. Declarations regarding non-diffusion might be tacked on for good measure.

3. Discussion. European concerns about the Soviet MRBM's threatening Europe will be intensified as a result of the concern which the US has so dramatically evidenced over Soviet MRBM's in Cuba. The Europeans would welcome a US initiative which responded to their concern, even while the US was seeking their support for action to meet its concern. Such a US initiative would make clear that the Cuban crisis - far from diverting us from our positive long-term policies in Europe - had intensified our desire to prosecute these policies.

A more positive US stance on the multilateral MRBM force would also help to stand off pressures within the US Government for bilateral sharing with France; these pressures, usually grow as a result of East-West crises and the attendant felt need for US-French cooperation to withstand such pressures is to offer a constructive alternative.

The presentation of the multilateral concept to the NAC by Gerard Smith last Monday elicited a great deal of interest. The Germans, Italians, Belgians, Turks, and Canadians have shown themselves favorable. Our people in Paris believe that we might get a fairly early consensus, in principle, among these countries to go ahead with a multilateral force, if the US posture became one of positive leadership. In this event, the Soviets would once again have found themselves in the position of persuading the

alliance

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alliance to take steps that should bring its members closer together and that are easier to take in an atmosphere of crisis than of "business as usual."

If it thus took a lead, the US would have to be prepared to participate in the force initially. There might be an understanding, however, that the European countries could buy out the US later, if they then wanted to convert the force into a European force.

We would probably not have to solve the control problem to get an initial consensus on setting up the force; ~~The~~ Germans have indicated that they would be prepared to accept US warhead custody as a transitional measure, while long-term control arrangements were being hammered out.

The Germans, Italian, US, and other financial contributions would probably be sufficient to meet initial costs of a modest force, e.g., 10 ships and 80 missiles (as contrasted with the 25 ship-200 missile force we have been discussing in NATO). Once it was clear that the force was actually being created, the UK might participate and make a contribution. Laloy has indicated that French participation at least on a token basis, should not be excluded if we did not insist - as we would not - on France's abandoning its national program.

Progress on the multilateral MRBM front is probably prerequisite to any resolution of the Turkish IRBM problem. For we could not take any action regarding removal of IRBM's from Turkey which would give the Turks the feeling of being pressed to give up these weapons against their will. On the other hand, the Turks might well be willing to remove these obsolescent weapons, if an acceptable alternative were at hand. The multilateral sea-based force is such an alternative; and the Turks might well see it in this light, if the US were taking the lead to bring it about.

The Turks might well be willing to make a statement of their position on this matter as soon as there was enough

evidence

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evidence of interest in the multilateral MRBM force to make it look like a serious contender. The more positive US stance referred to above would be designed to produce this show of interest now. The actual dismantling of the IREM's could begin later, when a firm allied decision to activate the multilateral force had actually been made.

A unilateral announcement by the Government of Turkey that it intended to remove IREM's would pave the way for an exchange of great power declarations, which would do no more, insofar as Turkey was concerned, than ratify the already announced policy of its government. If the exchange could be broadened to include a ban on MRBM's in the Middle East as a whole (including the Arab states and Israel), this would make it that much easier to avoid the appearance of a Turkey-Cuba deal. We would not want, under any circumstance, to engage in a negotiation which seemed explicitly to equate our position in Turkey with the Soviet position in Turkey.

5. Conclusion. Each of the actions proposed above would seem to make sense on its own merits. Taken together, they fit into an initially re-enforcing package of actions, which would offer some chance of resolving the crisis in a way favorable to our interests. To have any chance of success, or to forestall passions and pressures which could take events out of our hands, this course of action would need to be prosecuted with utmost despatch.

6. Recommendations. That you discuss this course of action with the President. A memorandum summarizing the proposal for your use with the President is attached. If the President approves of the general concept, we will then present specific recommendations to you concerning US actions to give it effect.

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EXCISED COPY FOLLOWS

2115 P S105 D B1A5 65 141 (2) [REDACTED]
October 23, 1962 [REDACTED]

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THROUOH: S/S.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY [REDACTED] DATE 4-4-
() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
() DENY () DEGRADE TS TO PAR
() DELETE () DECLASSIFY TS
FOIA Exemptions (b)(1); (b)(5).
() CONFIDENTIAL TO NMIC/AMC
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C OADR

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ISJPPC/CDR 3 Date. 4/3/92

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RELEASE DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE DECLASSIFY IN PART
 DENY
FOIA Exemptions B1
PA Exemptions

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations [REDACTED]

land-based

() CLASSIFY as () S or () C OADR
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